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Abstract
For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before 
international judicial bodies. Only recently, however, have they begun 
acting as respondents. This Article considers how five areas of 
international law—international investment law, international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and the law 
of the sea—deal with non-state actors in order to identify a lex generalis
governing non-state actors as respondents. In particular, this Article 
examines two elements that must be established to make a successful claim 
against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire obligations 
under international law; and (2) how international judicial bodies acquire 
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before 
international judicial bodies. The Jay Treaty of 1794—widely considered 
to be the foundation of modern arbitration1—permitted non-state actors to 
file claims against states. 2 Since then, many international claims 
commissions, 3 international investment agreements, 4 and international 
human rights treaties 5 have similarly permitted non-state actors to file 
claims against states. In fact, the majority of claims heard by the first 
international court with jurisdiction over states, the first Central American 
Court of Justice, were filed by individuals.6 The phenomenon of non-state 
actors acting as claimants before international judicial bodies is thus well 
established in international law.
The phenomenon of non-state actors acting as respondents, however, 
is relatively new. In 1945, the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg was established to adjudicate claims under international law 
against individuals.7 Beginning in the 1990s, various international criminal 
courts and tribunals were similarly established to prosecute individuals for 
international crimes.8 It thus appeared that the phenomenon of non-state 
actors acting as respondents was confined to the sphere of international 
criminal law. This conception, however, is inaccurate. Some international 
                                                
1. See Charles H. Brower II, Arbitration, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 13 (2007).
2. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., arts. 6, 7, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].  Article VI of the Jay Treaty also permitted non-state actors to file 
claims against other non-state actors, but the basis for these claims was contracts, not international law.  
See id. art. 6.  1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 
TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 271–76 (1898).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the 
Occupation ch. 5, art. 7, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219.
4. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Arg., art. 7, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
5. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
6. Rosa Riquelme Cortado, Central American Court of Justice (1907–18), in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 16 (2013).
7. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 1, 5, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 
280.
8. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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investment agreements (IIAs) grant arbitral tribunals broad jurisdiction over 
disputes between investors and states, 9 such that states have filed 
counterclaims against investors, leading the investors to act as respondents. 
Also, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
grants the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) jurisdiction over “disputes between parties to a 
contract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, state 
enterprises and natural or juridical persons,”10 suggesting that a non-state 
contractor could act as a respondent in such a dispute settlement proceeding.
Admittedly, it is not common for non-state actors to act as respondents 
before international judicial bodies. Nevertheless, as non-state actors are 
playing an increasingly important role in international law, this 
phenomenon is likely to become more common. This Article thus 
examines the particular issues that arise when non-state actors act as 
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a preliminary matter, a few terms must be defined. First, as used in 
this Article, a “non-state actor” is any actor that is not only not a state, but also 
not an international organization. Non-state actors may thus be, inter alia,
individuals, corporations, terrorist groups, and sub-state entities. Second, the 
term “claim” in this Article refers to claims or counterclaims only under public 
international law, not under domestic law or private international law. As a 
result, contractual claims in international commercial arbitration are excluded 
from the scope of this Article. Third, a “claimant” is any actor that makes a 
claim or counterclaim against another actor before an international judicial 
body. In some forums, the “claimant” is more commonly called an “applicant” 
or a “petitioner,” but for uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term 
“claimant.” Fourth, a “respondent” is the actor against whom the claim or 
counterclaim is made. In the context of international criminal law, the 
respondent is often called an “accused” or a “defendant,” but again for 
uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term “respondent.” Fifth, an 
“international judicial body” is any public international body that renders 
decisions on the responsibility of the respondent on the basis of public 
international law. The term thus includes, inter alia, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), investor-state arbitral tribunals, panels of the World Trade 
Organization, international criminal tribunals, claims commissions, and human 
rights treaty bodies.
                                                
9. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain, art. X(1), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 
202 [hereinafter Argentina-Spain BIT].
10. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 187(c), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (emphasis added).
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Over the past decade, the literature on non-state actors has exploded. 
Leading commentators have written hundreds of books and articles on the 
implications of non-state actors acting as subjects of international law.11
Nevertheless, the existing literature does not provide a sufficient 
understanding of non-state actors acting as respondents before international 
judicial bodies. This is for two principal reasons. The first reason is that 
most commentary on non-state actors focuses on their rights rather than 
their obligations. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that non-state 
actors seem to have more rights than obligations under international law.
Further, as noted above, there is a long history of non-state actors acting as 
claimants before international judicial bodies, whereas the phenomenon of 
non-state actors acting as respondents is rather new. All this said, today 
there is undoubtedly a growing literature on the obligations of non-state 
actors under international law. This is where the second reason comes into 
play: commentary on the obligations of non-state actors tend to focus on 
one particular area of law, one particular type of obligation, and/or one 
particular type of non-state actor. For example, many commentators have 
focused on the obligations of non-state armed groups under international 
humanitarian law. 12 Another popular topic is the obligations of 
corporations under international human rights law.13 Rather than focus on 
any particular area of law, obligation, or type of non-state actor, this Article 
aims to identify a lex generalis concerning non-state actors acting as 
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a general matter, a claimant must establish five elements to make a 
successful claim under international law against a respondent before an 
international judicial body. First, the respondent must hold an obligation under 
international law (“an international obligation”). Second, the respondent must 
have breached that obligation. Third, the respondent must have responsibility
under international law (“international responsibility”) for that breach. Fourth, 
                                                
11. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 498 (2006) [hereinafter Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations]; ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016); KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2011); Jean 
d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States in International Law: 
Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49, 49–67 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 416, 416–39 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Sufyan Droubi, Transactional Corporations and International Human Rights 
Law, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119 (2016); Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and 
Liability for International and Human Right Abuses:  Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW.
J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 222 (2008).
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the claimant must have the right to invoke that responsibility. And fifth, the 
judicial body must have jurisdiction over the matter.
This Article aims to address only the particular issues that arise when 
the respondent is a non-state actor. Notably, the second and fourth 
elements are inquiries for which, more often than not, particular issues do 
not arise when the respondent is a non-state actor as opposed to a state.
Particular issues could arise with respect to the third element, but this 
Article also does not address this element because of spatial constraints.  As 
a result, this Article examines only the first and fifth elements.
The Article is organized as follows: Section II will discuss the non-state 
actor’s obligation, focusing on how non-state actors acquire obligations under 
international law; Section III will discuss the judicial body’s jurisdiction,
focusing on how the judicial body acquires jurisdiction ratione personae over 
non-state actors; Section IV will then conclude the Article.
II. THE NON-STATE ACTOR’S OBLIGATION
A successful claimant must first establish that the non-state actor holds 
an obligation under international law. Commentators today generally agree 
that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law. The 
more difficult question, however, is how non-state actors acquire such 
obligations.
A. Theory
States acquire international obligations by operation of any of the 
sources of international law: treaties, custom, and general principles of law.
To this list may be added unilateral acts. An underlying theme that 
pervades most if not all these sources is consent: a state holds only 
obligations to which it has expressly or impliedly consented. For treaties, 
the pacta tertiis rule provides that a state cannot be bound by a treaty to 
which it did not consent.14 And for custom, the persistent objector rules 
similarly provides that a state cannot be bound by a custom to which it 
objected during its formation.15 Although some scholars assert that non-
state actors are not subject to this “voluntarist paradigm,”16 this Article 
proceeds on the assumption that they are subject to the paradigm. The 
                                                
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT].
15. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, at 126 (Dec. 18); Asylum 
(Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 277–78 (Nov. 20).
16. See, e.g., Marko Milanoviü, Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (and Why We 
Should Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 39 (2011).
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reason is that, if international law has now developed to the point where 
non-state actors may act as respondents before international judicial bodies 
and may be held responsible for breaches of international law, then they 
should be treated the same way that states are treated in the context of 
dispute settlement proceedings. In light of this understanding, in order to 
determine how non-state actors may acquire obligations under international 
law, one must examine the three traditional sources of international law 
(treaties, custom, and general principles of law), as well as unilateral acts.
First, can non-state actors acquire obligations by treaty? At first, the 
answer appears to be in the negative because non-state actors generally may 
not be parties to treaties. Nevertheless, Section 4 of Part III (Articles 34 to 
38) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) expressly 
recognizes the possibility that a treaty may create rights and obligations for 
non-parties.17 Although Section 4 refers only to non-party states, as one 
esteemed commentator has observed,18 there is no reason why the section 
should not also apply to non-party non-state actors. Article 34 of the VCLT 
provides the general rule that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations 
or rights for a third State without its consent.”19 Article 35 then provides:
“An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the 
obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”20
Assuming that this latter provision is equally applied to non-state actors, 
there are two requirements for a non-state actor to acquire an obligation by 
treaty.  First, “the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means 
of establishing the obligation”; and second, “the [non-state actor] expressly 
accepts that obligation in writing.”21
As for the first requirement, it is not difficult to imagine how the 
parties to a treaty can express their intent for the provision in question to 
establish the obligation. The clearest example is where the text of the treaty 
expressly states that the non-state actor “shall” do something. Although 
this sort of provision is not common, it does indeed exist in many 
international treaties. For example, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II
provides: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
                                                
17. See VCLT, supra note 14, arts. 34–38.
18. See Cassese, supra note 12, at 423.
19. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 34.
20. Id. art. 35.
21. Id.
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participated in the armed conflict . . . .”22 Although the “authorities in 
power” at the end of hostilities may be a state, it may also be a non-state 
armed group. As another example, Article 21(4) of UNCLOS provides: 
“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only . . . .”23 One can also find 
examples in provisions governing the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. 
For example, the second paragraph of the Annex to the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rhine provides: “If the chair of the arbitral tribunal has 
not been appointed . . . , the President of the International Court of Justice 
shall appoint an arbitrator . . . .”24
There are three ways to interpret these provisions. First, one can interpret 
them as only imposing an obligation on the state that has jurisdiction over the 
non-state actor to ensure that the non-state actor complies with the prescription. 
This interpretation, however, is unpersuasive given that the drafters could 
easily have rephrased the provision to make clear that the obligation was on the 
state, not the non-state actor. Second, one can interpret them as automatically 
placing an obligation on the non-state actor. Under the voluntarist paradigm 
outlined above, this interpretation is unpersuasive because, if non-state actors 
are to be considered as independent subjects under international law, states 
should not have the power to directly impose obligations under international 
law on them, even though states may impose obligations under domestic law 
on them. Third, one can interpret these provisions as merely expressing an 
intention by the states to bind a non-state actor, fulfilling the first requirement 
under Article 35 of the VCLT. This third approach is the most sensible.
As for the second requirement, if non-state actors are to be considered 
as independent subjects under international law, it makes sense to require 
them to expressly consent to any treaty obligation that binds them. If 
Article 35 requires that non-party states expressly accept treaty obligations 
in writing for the obligations to bind them,25 then it makes sense for non-
party, non-state actors to do the same. In conclusion, then, although non-
state actors generally may not be parties to treaties, they may still acquire 
obligations by treaty.
                                                
22. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, ¶ 5, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (emphasis added).
23. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 92(1) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 21(4).
24. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine annex, ¶ 2, Apr. 12, 1999 (emphasis added); 
see also Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia, Slovn.-Croat., art. 2, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 2009 (“In case that [the 
Parties] cannot agree . . . the President and the two members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be appointed 
by the President of the International Court of Justice from the list.”).
25. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.
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Second, can non-state actors acquire obligations by custom? Once 
again, at first, the answer appears to be in the negative because custom, 
according to the ICJ, is “to be looked for primarily in the actual practice 
and opinio juris of States”26—hence the notions of “state practice” and 
“opinio juris.” Nevertheless, one must recall that Article 38(1)(b) of the 
ICJ Statute does not mention “states” at all; rather, it defines “custom” as
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”27 By the terms of the 
Article 38(1)(b) alone, there is thus no reason why a non-state actor’s 
practice and opinio juris cannot create custom binding on non-state actors.
Third, can non-state actors acquire obligations by general principle of 
law? This question is difficult to answer given the lack of consensus over 
what constitutes a general principle of law. Nevertheless, as Alain Pellet 
notes, there is “little doubt” that general principles of law are “unwritten 
legal norms of a wide-ranging character,” “recognized in the municipal 
laws of States,” and “transposable at the international level.”28 If general 
principles of law may impose obligations on states, there is thus no reason 
why they may not impose obligations on non-state actors.
Fourth, can non-state actors acquire obligations by unilateral act? As 
the ICJ held in the Nuclear Tests cases, “[i]t is well recognized that 
declarations made by way of unilateral acts . . . may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations.”29 To the extent that a non-state actor makes a 
similar declaration that meets the requirements set forth in the Nuclear 
Tests cases, there is no reason why it should not be bound by such a 
declaration.
In conclusion, then, non-state actors may acquire obligations by treaty, 
custom, general principle of law, and unilateral act.
B. Lex Specialis
As mentioned above, courts, tribunals, and commentators generally 
agree that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law. 
The large majority of such courts, tribunals, and commentators do not 
                                                
26. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27 
(June 3) (emphasis added); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 183 (June 27).
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153, 
UKTS 67 (1946).
28. Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 677, 766 (Andreas Zimmerman, et al. eds., 2012).
29. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20); Nuclear 
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).
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propound a theory for how non-state actors acquire such obligations. Those 
that do tend to only propose such a theory in their particular area of 
international law. This Section examines these theories.
1. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law (IHL) is perhaps the area of 
international law where scholars have discussed the question of how non-
state actors acquire obligations the most. The question arises most 
frequently in the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).
Common Article 3 (CA3) and Additional Protocol II (APII) both apply in 
NIACs. 30 The issue, however, is that NIACs are generally conflicts 
between a state and a non-state actor. It would be unfair for IHL 
obligations to apply only to one side of an armed conflict. As a result, 
commentators generally agree that CA3 and APII apply not only to states
engaged in NIACs, but also to non-state actors engaged in NIACs. States 
acquire obligations under CA3 and APII by ratifying or acceding to the 
respective treaties. The question, however, is how non-state actors acquire
obligations under CA3 and APII.
Three major groups of theories have developed in this regard.31 The 
first and most popular group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to 
non-state actors through the state’s ratification of or accession to the treaty
because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law, and/or the fact that 
the non-state actors are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within the 
jurisdiction of the state. As Antonio Cassese notes, however, this group of 
theories arguably confuses international law and domestic law.32 It may 
explain how obligations become binding on the non-state actor under 
domestic law, but it does not explain how obligations under international 
law are imposed on the non-state actors.33
The second group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to non-
state actors through the non-state actors’ consent to their application by 
virtue of unilateral acts or Article 35 of the VCLT (as applied to non-state 
                                                
30. Article 19 of The Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954 also applies in NIACs, 
but commentary tends to focus on CA3 and APII.  See Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
31. For commentary attempting to enumerate the theories, see Andrew Clapham, Non-State 
Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 557, 557–79 (Daniel Moeckli, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, supra note 11, at 498; Cassese, supra note 1212, at 420–30; 
Milanoviü, supra note 16, at 39.
32. See Cassese, supra note 12, at 429.
33. See id.
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actors rather than states). Cassese has been an advocate of the latter.34 The 
first requirement of Article 35—that “the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation”35—is met by the 
fact that the parties to the Geneva Conventions and APII undoubtedly
intended the treaties to apply to all sides of a NIAC, including non-state 
actors. The trickier part is the second requirement—the requirement that 
“the [non-state actor] expressly accepts that obligation in writing.” 36
Cassese recognizes that:
As for the second test, i.e. the assent by the third party to the 
rights or duties deriving from the treaty, it will of course be 
necessary to determine in each civil war whether rebels are ready 
and willing to accept the Protocol. This willingness may be 
shown in various ways; by a unilateral declaration addressed to 
the Government, by tacit compliance with the Protocol, by a 
request to the ICRC to intervene and guarantee respect for the 
Protocol, or by any other similar means.37
Interestingly, he appears to take the view that the acceptance need not 
be express nor in writing, as he considers “tacit compliance with the 
Protocol” as a means of expressing acceptance of obligations thereunder.38
The third group of theories is that CA3 and APII apply as customary 
or treaty law to non-state actors either because the customary or treaty rules 
apply to non-state actors generally, apply to non-state actors that reach a 
certain level of organization, apply to non-state actors that exercise state-
like functions, and/or apply to non-state actors that claim to represent the 
state.
2. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law (IHRL) is another area where there is 
significant literature on how non-state actors acquire obligations under 
international law. It is now widely accepted that many human rights 
treaties confer rights on individuals. But there is a question as to whether 
non-state actors have the obligation under international law to respect such 
rights. In particular, a question that has often arisen in this context is 
                                                
34. See id. at 420–30.
35. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.
36. Id.
37. Cassese, supra note 12, at 428.
38. Id.
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whether corporations have international obligations to respect economic, 
social, and cultural rights (ESCRs).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
which monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), appears to answer this
question in the negative. The ICESCR confers rights on individuals, and 
the CESCR has recognized the importance of corporations in respecting 
these rights. Nevertheless, the CESCR has focused its attention on state 
obligations under the ICESCR, not corporate obligations.39 Similarly, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted many conventions 
that confer rights on individuals and aim to ensure that corporations respect 
labour rights. Nevertheless, as far as the present author is aware, the ILO 
conventions do not impose any direct obligations on corporations. Rather, 
they impose obligations on state parties to enact legislation and take other 
measures in order to influence the conduct of corporations and ultimately 
achieve the conventions’ objectives.40
If one is to argue that corporations have obligations to respect ESCRs, 
one would have to identify a particular theory under which they acquire 
such obligations. One could adopt—and scholars have adopted—any of the 
three groups of theories discussed above in the context of IHL for this 
question as it relates to IHRL. One could argue that corporations acquire
such an obligation by virtue of the state’s ratification of or accession to the 
ICESCR because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law and/or the 
fact that the corporations are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within 
the jurisdiction of the state. Or perhaps, corporations may expressly or 
impliedly consent to the obligation of respecting ESCRs or the obligation 
could also arise from customary law, whether it be a customary rule that 
applies to corporations generally, applies to corporations that reach a 
certain level of organization, and/or applies to corporations that exercise 
state-like functions. All of these theories could rationally be invoked.
An additional theory has also been proposed in this context. Steven 
Ratner has argued that, contrary to the text of the ILO conventions, “both 
the purpose of the conventions and their wording make clear that they do 
                                                
39. See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 
(2017) on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 24]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the Obligations 
of State Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2011/1 (July 12, 2011).
40. See, e.g., Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment 
and Occupation arts. 2–3, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960).
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recognize duties on enterprises regarding their employees.”41 In particular, 
he argues that the affirmation of rights in the conventions imply 
corresponding obligations. As an example, he notes:
[O]ne of the ILO’s so-called core conventions, the 1949 
Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right To Organise and To Bargain Collectively, states simply, 
“Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-
union discrimination in respect of their employment.” While 
clearly an injunction to governments to enact legislation against 
certain behavior by industry, the obligation also entails, indeed 
presupposes, a duty on the corporation not to interfere with the 
ability of employees to form unions.42
The investor-state tribunal in the recent case of Urbaser v. Argentina
took a similar approach. It effectively held that corporations acquire the 
obligation to respect ESCRs under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) because it is an implied “corresponding obligation”
derivative from the mere existence of rights.43 The tribunal stated:
It may be said that these and other provisions do not state more 
than rights pertaining to each individual. Nevertheless, in order 
to ensure that such rights be enjoyed by each person, it must
necessarily also be ensured that no other individual or entity,
public or private, may act in disregard of such rights, which then 
implies a corresponding obligation.44
Nevertheless, neither Ratner nor the Urbaser v. Argentina tribunal 
explain how a corporation acquires such obligations in the framework of 
the sources of international law.
                                                
41. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 478 (2001).
42. Id. at 478–79.  Ratner also argues that certain conventions impose direct obligations by 
virtue of their text.  He cites to Article 16(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, which 
provides that “[e]mployers shall be required to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to 
health.”  Id. at 479 n.139.  Nevertheless, he fails to note that the language “shall be required” does not 
impose a direct obligation on the employer, but rather on another entity (probably the State) that has the 
power to impose requirements on the employer.  See id. at 478–79, 479 n.139.
43. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1196 (Dec. 8, 2016).
44. Id.
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3. International Investment Law
Although IIAs generally impose obligations on states, some IIAs—
particularly newer ones—also impose obligations on investors. A recent
example is the Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 14 of 
which provides in relevant part:
(1) Investors . . . shall comply with environmental assessment 
screening . . . .
(2) Investors . . . shall conduct a social impact assessment of the 
potential investment . . . .
(3) Investors . . . shall apply the precautionary principle to their 
environmental impact assessment.45
An older example is the Investment Agreement of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC Agreement), Article 9 of which provides:
The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force 
in the host state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb 
public order or morals or that may be prejudicial to the public 
interest.  He is also to refrain from exercising restrictive practices 
and from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means.46
The question is, then, how the investor acquires obligations under such 
IIAs. On the one hand, one can argue that the obligations are automatically 
imposed on the investor because the investor is operating within the 
jurisdiction and/or on the territory of the states in question. On the other 
hand, one may ask how the investor can express its acceptance of the 
obligations imposed by the IIA. There are many options here. One can 
argue that the investor accepts the obligations, inter alia, by merely owning 
an investment in one of the contracting states (such that the obligations 
would apply in respect of all investments); by the act of investing in one of 
the contracting states (such that the obligations would only apply in respect 
of investments made after the entry into force of the IIA); or by the act of 
filing an investment claim against the host state (such that the obligations 
would only apply in respect of investments whose investors filed a claim 
with respect to the investments in question). The investor-state tribunal in 
                                                
45. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art 
14., Dec. 3, 2016.  See also id. art. 18(2)–(3) (stating that “[i]nvestors . . . shall uphold human rights in 
the host state [and] [i]nvestors . . . shall act in accordance with core labour standards as required”).
46. Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member 
States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, art. 9, June 5, 1981.
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Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, in the context of examining the applicability of 
Article 9 of the OIC Agreement, adopted this last approach.47
C. Lex Generalis
In light of this examination of international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, and international investment law, there are 
four general theories for how non-state actors may acquire obligations 
under international law: (1) the non-state actor acquires an obligation 
because the non-state actor is a national of, on the territory of, or within the 
jurisdiction of a state that is bound by the obligation; (2) the non-state actor 
acquires an obligation because the non-state actor consented to the 
obligation; (3) the non-state actor acquires an obligation because customary 
law directly binds that non-state actor; and (4) the non-state actor acquires 
an obligation because the obligation corresponds to a right established in 
international law. The first three theories have been invoked in the context 
of international humanitarian law, all four in the context of international 
human rights law, and only the first two in international investment law.
International 
Humanitarian 
Law
International 
Human Rights 
Law
International 
Investment Law
Theory 1
(Relationship with 
State)
X X X
Theory 2
(Consent)
X X X
Theory 3
(Custom)
X X
Theory 4
(Corresponding 
Obligation)
X
If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the 
first, third, and fourth theories could not hold water. The first theory is 
                                                
47. Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–63 (Dec. 15, 
2014).
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weak because the mere fact that states can impose obligations on non-state 
actors in domestic law, does not mean they can also do so in international 
law. The third theory is weak because there has been very little study on 
the practice and opinio juris of non-state actors. And the fourth theory is 
weak because it relies on a purely abstract logic rather than one grounded in 
any of the sources of international law.
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE NON-STATE ACTOR
Another element that a successful claimant must establish is that the 
judicial body has jurisdiction over the matter. In general, there are four 
dimensions of jurisdiction: jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione materiae,
ratione temporis, and ratione loci. The questions of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, ratione temporis, and ratione loci are for the most part the same 
regardless of whether the respondent is a state or a non-state actor. The 
question with respect to jurisdiction ratione personae, however, raises some 
novel questions in cases where the respondent is a non-state actor.
A. Theory
The fundamental principle governing jurisdiction ratione personae is 
the principle of consent: in order for a judicial body to have jurisdiction 
over a subject, the subject must consent to the judicial body’s jurisdiction.48
States give such consent most often by treaty (e.g., dispute settlement 
clauses, special agreements, arbitration treaties). Nevertheless, states have 
also given such consent by unilateral act (e.g., Article 36(2) declarations, 
forum prorogatum49). In addition, according to some, states may also give 
such consent by operation of a general principle of law: estoppel.50
                                                
48. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, ¶ 33 (July 23, 
1923); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 
Rep. 19, 32 (June 15).
49. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (Mar. 25); Certain 
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶¶ 
60–64 (June 4); Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Provisional Measure Order, 
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 102, ¶ 21 (June 17); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, 
https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/#c3685.
50. See “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), ITLOS Case No. 20, Order, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 52–
73 (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/publish
ed/C20_Order_151212.pdf.  But see Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award 
on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 219 (Oct. 26, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0309.pdf; Megan L. Wagner, Jurisdiction 
by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1777, 1777 (1986).
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Although non-state actors cannot conclude treaties, they can still 
consent to a judicial body’s jurisdiction by internationalized agreements,
Article 35 of the VCLT, as well as by unilateral act and, in theory, estoppel.
Indeed, non-state actors have given such consent, most often by unilateral 
act, when acting as claimants. In such contexts, the question of jurisdiction 
ratione personae is a non-issue because it is assumed that the non-state 
actor consents to jurisdiction by the mere act of filing the claim. In cases 
where the non-state actor is a respondent, however, the issue is not as
straightforward.
B. Lex Specialis
Currently, international judicial bodies have jurisdiction ratione 
personae over non-state actors acting as respondents in at least three areas 
of international law: international investment law,51 the law of the sea,52
and international criminal law.53 This section examines how non-state 
actors consent to the jurisdiction of the judicial body in these three areas of 
law.
1. International Investment Law
In all known investor-state arbitrations to date, the investor has always 
been the party initiating the arbitration. As a result, the issue of jurisdiction 
over non-state actors as respondents arises only where the state files 
counterclaims. Both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules allow for 
counterclaims, but the counterclaims must be within the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae and jurisdiction ratione personae of the arbitral tribunal.54
Many IIAs do not allow for counterclaims because they grant investor-
state tribunals jurisdiction ratione materiae only over disputes concerning 
                                                
51. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims (Feb. 7, 2017); Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao 
Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award 
(Dec. 8, 2016).
52. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c)–(e).
53. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
54. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 46, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; 
G.A. Res. 31/98, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Dec. 
15, 1976).  
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the host state’s allegedly wrongful conduct. For example, Article 9 of the 
Greece-Romania bilateral investment treaty (BIT) grants jurisdiction
ratione materiae only over “[d]isputes between an investor of a Contracting 
Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter
under this Agreement”.55 On the other hand, the language of other IIAs is
broader. In Urbaser v. Argentina, the provision at stake was Article X(1) of 
the Argentina-Spain BIT, which grants jurisdiction ratione materiae over 
“disputes . . . in connection with the investments.”56 In such cases where a 
tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae over the counterclaim, it must 
then proceed to examine whether it has jurisdiction ratione personae over 
the investor as a respondent. Investor-state tribunals have declared that 
they have jurisdiction ratione personae over investors as respondents on the 
basis of two grounds.
First, in some cases, the investor and the state expressly conclude an 
agreement granting the tribunal jurisdiction over the counterclaim. For
example, in MINE v. Guinea57 and Atlantic Triton v. Guinea,58 such consent 
was given in the concession agreements in question, and in Burlington v.
Ecuador, it was given in a separate agreement.59
Second, in other cases, the investor does not expressly grant the tribunal 
jurisdiction over counterclaims. Here, a question arises as to whether the 
claimant’s submission of the principal claim to arbitration qualifies as consent to 
counterclaims that may be filed against it. In the recent cases of Goetz v. Burundi 
(II), 60 Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, 61 and Urbaser v. Argentina, 62 the tribunal
answered this question in the affirmative.
                                                
55. The treaty is not publicly available, but this provision was quoted in Spyridon Roussalis v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 868 (Dec. 7, 2011).  In that case, Romania filed a 
counterclaim, but the tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction over it.  Id. ¶ 869.
56. Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 9, art. 10(1).
57. Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Award, (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ICSID Rep. 61 (1997).
58. Atlantic Triton Co. Ltd. v. People’s Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/1, Award, (Apr. 21, 1986), 3 ICSID Rep. 13 (1995).
59. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims, ¶ 60 (Feb. 7, 2017).
60. Antoine Goetz & Consorts & Others and S.A. Affinage des Metaux v. Republic of 
Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award, ¶ 278 (June 21, 2012).
61. See Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–64 (Dec. 15, 
2014).
62. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1147 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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2. Law of the Sea
Article 187(c) of UNCLOS grants the ITLOS Seabed Disputes 
Chamber jurisdiction ratione materiae over disputes with contractors 
operating in the deep seabed. 63 Since contractors cannot be party to 
UNCLOS, the question is how the Chamber may acquire jurisdiction 
ratione personae over contractors.
The answer is contracts. Any contractor engaging in exploration or 
exploitation of the deep seabed must have a contract in force with the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), the intergovernmental authority that 
organizes and controls activities in the deep seabed. 64 The ISA has 
developed standard terms for exploration contracts, which read: “Any 
dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this contract shall be settled in accordance with Part XI, section 5, of the 
Convention.”65 The current draft standard terms for exploitation contracts 
is substantially the same.66
3. International Criminal Law
In international criminal law (ICL), unlike in international investment 
law and the law of the sea, it is very difficult to argue that the non-state 
actor in question—the individual on trial—consented, even impliedly, to 
the jurisdiction of the judicial body. One thus should question how 
international criminal courts and tribunals acquire jurisdiction ratione 
personae over individuals.
Interestingly enough, scholars tend to sidestep this question.67 The 
few that have addressed it rely on a single theory: states delegate their 
punitive power to international criminal courts and tribunals by way of 
                                                
63. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c) (emphasis added).
64. Id. art. 157(1).
65. Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to Amendments to 
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and Related 
Matters at Its Nineteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/19/C/17, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (July 22, 2013);
Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area at Its Eighteenth 
Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/18/A/11, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (Oct. 22, 2012); Decision of the Assembly of 
the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area at Its Sixteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1, at annex 4, 
sec. 25.1 (Nov. 15, 2010).
66. INT’L SEABED AUTH., DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MINERAL 
EXPLOITATION IN THE AREA 76, annex VI, Sec. 43 (2016).
67. See, e.g., Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 527, 532–33 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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treaty (e.g., International Criminal Court), U.N. Security Council resolution 
(e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), or occupying authority (e.g.,
Nuremberg, Tokyo, Iraq).68 As the International Military Tribunal held:
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it 
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct 
of the Trial.  In doing so, they have done together what any one 
of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that 
any nation has the right [thus] to set up special courts to 
administer law.  With regard to the constitution of the Court, all 
that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on 
the facts and law.69
C. Lex Generalis
In light of this examination of international investment law, law of the 
sea, and international criminal law, there are three general theories for how 
non-state actors may consent to the jurisdiction of an international judicial 
body: (1) the non-state actor concludes an agreement with the state; (2) the 
non-state actor consents to jurisdiction by unilateral act; and (3) the state 
delegates power it has under domestic law to the judicial body acting under 
international law. The first two theories have been invoked in the context 
of international investment law, the first theory in the context of the law of 
the sea, and only the last theory in international criminal law.
International 
Investment Law
Law of the Sea International 
Criminal Law
Agreement X X
Unilateral Act X
Delegated Power X
                                                
68. See, e.g., 1 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2013); Robert 
Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty:  Another Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979, 985 
(2006).
69. Trial of the Major War Crimes Before the International Military Tribunal, Judgment (Oct. 
1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216–17 (1947).
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If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the 
last theory would not be valid. The first two theories, however, would be 
perfectly acceptable given that they are based on the consent of the non-
state actor. Nevertheless, it would be unlikely for any individual subject to 
an international criminal proceeding to consent to the proceedings against 
him or her. One may thus consider international criminal law to be an 
exception—a justifiable lex specialis. After all, in domestic law, criminal 
cases similarly do not require the consent of the parties. It would thus be 
unrealistic to impose a consent requirement in international criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article examined two elements that must be established to make a 
successful claim against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire 
obligations under international law; and (2) how international judicial 
bodies acquire jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors. 
Interestingly, the five different areas of law examined deal with these two
elements differently, and associated commentators have propounded 
varying theories with regards to the two elements. Thus, there appears to 
be greater divergence than convergence.
This raises the question of whether a lex generalis is appropriate for non-
state actors acting as respondents. Perhaps, unlike the regimes for states and 
international organizations, the regime for non-state actors should exist only as 
lex specialis in particular areas of law. This way, one can better explain why 
there are divergences with regards to the two aforementioned elements in the 
examined areas of law. On the other hand, one can argue that this divergence 
is problematic because the fundamental principles of international adjudication 
should be the same across the board. As a result, a divergence between two 
areas of law actually means that at least one area of law is not treating non-state 
actors as they should be treated.
Regardless of which perspective one takes, the ultimate conclusion of 
this Article is that non-state actors acting as respondents before 
international judicial bodies must be taken seriously as subjects of 
international law. Taking them seriously means that they should, for the 
most part, have the same protections that states have: (1) non-state actors 
should not be subject to obligations under international law unless one can 
point to a concrete source of international law that imposes such an 
obligation on them; and (2) international judicial bodies should not have 
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors without their consent.
Only by respecting these principles, though perhaps with a few exceptions,
can one hope to develop a legitimate system for non-state actors acting as
respondents before international judicial bodies.
